

IDPC Briefing Paper

Drug control and its consequences in Rio de Janeiro

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The International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) is a global network of NGOs and professional networks that specialise in issues related to illegal drug production and use. The Consortium aims to promote objective and open debate on the effectiveness, direction and content of drug policies at national and international level, and supports evidence-based policies that are effective in reducing drug-related harm. It produces occasional briefing papers, disseminates the reports of its member organisations about particular drug-related matters, and offers expert consultancy services to policy makers and officials around the world.

Introduction

Although Rio de Janeiro (Rio) has not been the capital of Brazil since the 1960s, it is a beautiful city known internationally for its fireworks show on New Year's Eve on Copacabana beach and its carnival parades in the Sambadrome. The local violence associated with police repression and illicit drugs – known as Rio's urban war – is also known well beyond Brazil's national borders.

This article presents the challenges of responding to the illicit drug market and its associated violence in Rio, highlighting the characteristics and dynamics of the markets, the impacts of the current drug policy approach adopted by the State of Rio on the scale of the illicit market, and its implications for the human rights and security of affected populations, in particular for the slum dwellers.

The *firma*

Illicit drugs are available at multiple selling points across Rio, such as universities, nightclubs, spas, kiosks on the beaches, residential condominiums, shopping malls and other similar venues which have become known as *esticas* (stretches). A convenient system of home delivery is also available day and night for people wishing to purchase drugs. However, the bulk of the drug trade remains concentrated where it has always been – within poor communities near middle-class neighbourhoods in the South Zone of Rio and other outlets spread across the city's *favelas* (slums).

The *firma* (firm) refers to the drug trafficking activities that are taking place in the *favelas* under the control of a *dono* (owner). The firm is a complex business, involving a large number of stakeholders:

- The ‘airplanes’ sell or distribute drugs; the ‘scouts’ (or ‘firework-operators’) watch the entrances to the *favela* and warn on the arrival of police or government soldiers through radios, fireworks or kites; the ‘soldiers’ fight with the rival factions, the police and the militia⁴, and ensure the safety of the drug market; the ‘packagers’ weigh, prepare and put the merchandise in baggies for the retail market; and the ‘managers’ of the illicit drug markets, who take care of arms and containment. All of these actors in the market tend to be found among the most vulnerable communities living in Rio’s *favelas*.
- The *dono*, or ‘owner/boss of the hill’, is the leader of the gang who controls the illicit drug market in one or several *favelas*. He is responsible for buying the illicit substances sold on his turf and deciding on their quality and attributes, supplying weapons to the drug traffickers in the *favelas*, maintaining good relations with the owners of other *favelas*, paying bribes to the police, etc. The *donos* usually live in the *favelas* under their control. Alternatively, they carry out their activities from the high security prisons where they are held. This became possible in the 1980s, when the government lost control over its prison institutions and the criminal justice system started to be managed in implicit partnership with the criminal factions themselves, allowing incarcerated criminals to keep managing their businesses with impunity. If a *dono* is killed by the police, he is easily replaced by one of the numerous drug traffickers working in the *favelas*.
- The most dangerous and powerful individuals in charge of the drugs and arms trade are not found in any of the city’s *favelas*. Instead, they manage the market from highly secured and protected locations. Since police interventions exclusively target the *favelas*, they have little chance of arresting these high-level criminals, which remains the only way to have an impact on the scale of the illicit market.

The slums and the firm: drugs and violence in Rio’s *favelas*

The history of drug trafficking in Rio can be traced back to the 1950s, when Rio’s retail drug market mainly involved cannabis, and the retail market was small-scale, diffused and unstructured. Although guns were slowly introduced during that period, they were mainly used for the personal protection of the dealers.

In the 1970s, Rio became an increasingly important transit point for cocaine exports to America, Europe and South Africa, but it acted mainly as a storing house and an international outpost for drugs originating from Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. As a result, the prevalence of drug use in Brazil remained low.

The organisation of Rio’s retail drug market has its roots in prison, where the first drug faction was created. In the 1970s, in response to the rising number of bank robberies carried out by revolutionary groups to pay for their activities against the Brazilian State apparatus, the Government passed the *Lei de Segurança Nacional* (Law of National Security). As a result, all bank robberies were defined as a political crime, whether they were carried out by political activists or common criminals, and as a result, both groups were sent together to maximum security prisons. Common prisoners started to copy the concepts of group organisation and mutual reciprocity promoted by political prisoners. The first drug faction, the *Coletivo* – renamed *Falange Vermelha* and known as *Comando Vermelho* since the 1980s – was created in prison. After release from prison, it started to apply the notions learned from political prisoners for profitable gains. The faction established its business in the *favelas*, where it would be able to act without fear of State interference and take advantage of poor and neglected communities living there. Due to a traditional lack of government presence in the *favelas* to provide social and security services, the *donos* started to play an important role in these communities, mainly for the maintenance of order through violence or the threat of violence.⁵

At the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, Brazil became an important drug route in Latin America and witnessed an exponential growth in cocaine use in large cities, especially in Rio. The newly born drug faction took advantage of these developments, realising the vast profits that could be made from the sale of cocaine. They started to finance their drug retail business through profits obtained by carrying out an increasing number of criminal activities, such as robberies and kidnappings.⁶ The traditional *bocas de fumo* (smoke houses) gave room to more organised retail drug markets mainly focusing on the sale of cocaine,⁷ and armed gangs were established in the *favelas* in order to defend the selling points and surrounding communities from the police and other groups.

Throughout that period, the drug faction experienced internal divisions, and in the 1980s and early 1990s, the growing distrust and rivalry between the *Comando Vermelho*'s leaders led to the creation of three additional factions, the *Comando Vermelho Jovem*, *Amigos dos Amigos* and the *Terceiro Comando*. This resulted in an amplification of the levels of violence in the *favelas* because of the traffickers' increasing need to protect their territory from attacks by rival factions and the police.⁸ At the same time, the cocaine trade quickly expanded throughout Rio, and more guns were introduced by drug traffickers. When these weapons did not serve the interests of the drugs trade, they would be used by gangs specialised in property crime, and a portion of the gains obtained would be given back to the drug traffickers.⁹

Since their establishment in the *favelas*, the drug factions have become recognised as important figures in the socio-political life of the community. Rio's *favelas* are home to the poorest communities, they benefit from little infrastructure and few public services, and have been mainly ignored by the Brazilian government. This absence of power has led the communities to turn to alternative forms of protection through the drug traffickers, who began providing services such as food and medicine, and

protect the community from crime by enforcing social order. Since most drug dealers resided in the retail areas, bonds with the community were quickly created. Following the rise in power of the different factions, the role played by drug traffickers in the communities developed and turned into a system of 'forced reciprocity', according to which the traffickers would receive community protection in exchange for offering what the state failed to provide: the maintenance of social order, day-to-day support, economic stimulation and leisure activities.¹⁰ The traffickers established and enforced their own forms of behavioural code, and exercised many forms of control over the *favelas*, including curfews, or taxes on gas and electricity.¹¹ Drug traffickers built particularly close ties with children and young people, first by asking them to complete small tasks such as fetching food, water or coffee in exchange for money, then by recruiting them in exchange for weapons, power, drugs and women. For the *favela* communities, the despotic authoritarianism of the *donos* became a welcome alternative to – and a form of resistance against – State neglect and repressive police interventions.¹²

In the 1990s, high-calibre weapons started being distributed throughout Rio and the dynamics of the drug trade evolved with the traffickers' tendency towards territorial expansion. Because of police interventions and the high arrest and homicide rate among drug traffickers in the *favelas*, outsider groups, who had no ties with the local communities – and therefore fewer incentives to protect them¹³ – took control of the drug businesses and the territories on which they were taking place, fuelling the arms race with other groups and the police. In this context, the laboratories preparing cocaine started to relocate on the hills of the city, turning Brazil into a producer and consumer of illicit drugs.

In 1998, the 'Western Incentive' (*a gratificação Faroeste*) pushed police officers to execute drug traffickers in exchange for bonuses. In the late 1990s, Rio had between 500 and 600 *favelas*,

most of them under the control of armed youths working in retail drug markets. The situation deteriorated further with an explosion of the so-called 'crack epidemic' in the 2000s.¹⁴ Contrary to the situation in the 1980s, the drug retail market was by then controlled by young, inexperienced, fearless, heavily armed, de-territorialised¹⁵ and disorganised gangs. Indeed, the fast turnover among drug traffickers led to the involvement of younger and inexperienced individuals in the illicit drug market. The intensification of the confrontation with heavily armed police forces prompted traffickers to buy even more weapons with increasing destructive power, such as anti-aircraft guns.¹⁶ Since 2006, the involvement of the militia in Rio's *favelas* has further worsened the situation, and today, the arms race between the different drug trafficking factions, the militia and the Brazilian police is as fierce as ever.

One of the main characteristics of the present generation of young *favela* dwellers is that they are raised in communities where drug trafficking and the use of lethal violence is commonplace. They tend to reproduce the rules dictated by drug traffickers in their games, selling fake drugs, condemning their enemies to death and executing them.¹⁷ Several studies have demonstrated that these social dynamics impact very negatively on *favela* children, and have highlighted that it facilitates their recruitment into the illicit drug market.¹⁸

Anti-drug policy: Targets and consequences

Whereas the concept of harm reduction has been widely recognised as being an efficient approach to reduce the health and social harms associated with drug markets and use, harm reduction and prevention have never been a priority area within Rio's drug policy, and only a few government-driven isolated initiatives have been developed so far. The general population has little knowledge of the benefits of harm reduction and usually view these initiatives as promoting drug use.

The Brazilian government has preferred to focus the entirety of its drug control strategy on tough law enforcement and confrontations with organised criminal organisations in the *favelas*. These interventions have been carried out by police patrols or special police forces, such as the *Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais* (BOPE), a highly qualified battalion trained to intervene in critical circumstances such as intensive armed conflict between rival drug factions.¹⁹ Law enforcement efforts have mainly consisted of:


- **Seizures of illicit drugs and weapons.**

During the period 2001-2008, the Brazilian police seized 87,033 weapons. In relation to the scale of the weapons market, Dreyfus declared: 'What demonstrates the real and worrying dimension of the illicit arms trade in Brazil, for example, is that the number of small weapons seized in 2003 by the Colombian military and marine forces in counterinsurgency operations throughout the territory (6,919 weapons) – a country which is in a middle of an armed conflict – is only slightly superior to the estimated number of weapons that were seized during the same period by the police in only one Brazilian state, Rio de Janeiro, in relation to drug trafficking (5,714 weapons).'²⁰ Despite these large-scale police actions, however, drug dealers remain heavily armed and law enforcement interventions have not contributed to a widespread reduction in the scale of drug and arm trafficking in Rio. Instead, these actions have often worsened the already bleak situation by fostering the arms race and increasing the levels of violence in the *favelas*. This reflects a clear structural problem in the strategies implemented to tackle the illicit drug market in Rio.

- **Widespread arrests and incarceration.**

In July 2009, according to the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, over 180,000 individuals are reportedly incarcerated in Brazil, 70,000 of them having been condemned for drug trafficking offences

**Graph 1. Number of incarcerations for drug & arms trafficking in Brazil
from June 2006 to June 2009**
(Source: InfoPen/MJ)



(representing almost 40% of those incarcerated). In Rio alone, 8,000 individuals are currently incarcerated for drug-related offences.²¹ According to statistics collected by the Integrated Information System of the Penitentiary Department of Justice (InfoPen / MJ), around 20% of the Brazilian prison population was reported to be in pre-trial detention or incarcerated for drug-related crimes. Among those already condemned, 58% of drugs offenders were sentenced to a period equal or superior to 8 years' imprisonment. This has led to significant problems of prison overcrowding.²²

Although available data does clearly display the role that each of these individuals play in the illicit drug market, evidence suggests that most of these individuals are low-level drug dealers operating in poor communities. Indeed, this group constitutes the main target for police interventions, whereas wholesalers or major (and more powerful) drugs and weapons providers are rarely targeted by law enforcement activities.

The current law enforcement strategy also largely ignores the hierarchical importance of the different drug offenders operating in the illicit market, leading to a situation where those in control of the market are rarely exposed to arrest and imprisonment,

whereas those on the lowest rungs of the ladder are imprisoned in their thousands and immediately replaced on the ground. The current approach has also resulted in the imposition of highly disproportionate penalties regarding drug-related crimes, with the *donos* receiving the same sentences as low-level drug offenders such as couriers. Indeed, Brazilian laws do not provide clear parameters to differentiate between drug users, low-level, medium and large-scale drug dealers, leaving it to the police and the judge to classify them on a case by case basis.²³ In practice, when people are arrested for possession of illicit drugs, the differentiation between personal use and trafficking will be made according to the context in which they are arrested and of their social class, rather than dictated by a formal criminal code.²⁴


Since the 1980s, widespread corruption and the existing understandings between criminal factions and the judiciary and penitentiary systems have made it possible for the *donos* to operate freely and with impunity from the prison facilities where they are detained to manage their turf.²⁵

- Indiscriminate repression in the favelas.** As stated above, government interventions have exclusively targeted drug trafficking in the *favelas*, ignoring alternative selling points throughout Rio. From the point of view of the drug traffickers, these police interventions in the *favelas* are regarded as military action entering enemy territory during a war.²⁶ When entering the *favelas*, the police are usually attacked by heavily armed drug factions seeking to protect their territories. Since the *favela* residents are often considered to be 'accomplices' of the drug traffickers, they are indiscriminately targeted by the police during the assaults, leading to numerous abuses against innocent members of the community. As a result, the police are often regarded as violent, dangerous and abusive, whereas the factions are considered to be a lesser evil to the security of the *favela* residents. Between 2001 and 2008, over 7,542 people were

officially killed in clashes with the police in Rio's *favelas* or their surroundings,²⁷ and 220 police officers were killed in service.²⁸ In terms of proportion, there are 30 civilian deaths for each police officer killed in service. In Rio, the main perception in the *favelas* is therefore that law enforcement officers are not trained to protect life, but to kill. The relations between the police and the *favela* dwellers are further worsened by the fact that drug traffickers harshly punish any community member that speaks with the police.

To this day, Rio de Janeiro remains the Brazilian state with the highest death rate from firearms (46.0 per 100,000 inhabitants). The graph below presents a comparative view of the ratio of firearm-related deaths in California, Washington and New York compared to that of Rio de Janeiro between 1990 and 1999.²⁹

Graph 2. Firearm-related deaths, general population in California State, Washington State, New York State, Rio de Janeiro State and Rio de Janeiro City³⁰



Source: DATASUS e CDC

Therefore, far from reducing the overall scale of the problem, the drug strategy currently implemented in Rio by the Brazilian government has resulted in additional levels of violence, drug-related deaths and ‘disappearances’, especially within the most vulnerable communities living in Rio’s *favelas*. Such an approach has re-shaped the drug market into a more dangerous model:

- Older *donos* have been replaced by younger and inexperienced individuals from outside the communities. These new *donos* no longer respect the codes of conduct established by previous drug traffickers, have little respect for the *favela* residents and have therefore less restraint in using violence against them.
- Drug dealers used to sell drugs in a hidden and secretive way, the new generation of traffickers is more organised, and their business is more concentrated and more visible in the community.
- Drug dealers used to carry small weapons for their own protection, traffickers are now openly and more heavily armed, and use increasing levels of violence.
- Dealers used to be reluctant to let children get involved into drug trafficking, and if they did, it was never in an armed capacity. Today, however, children are largely involved in drug trafficking and violent activities. This has resulted in a substantial increase in the number of individuals aged under 18 years old being killed or injured by firearms in Rio.³¹

What solution for Rio de Janeiro?

Drug trafficking in Rio is highly complex and the current approach has largely ignored social, political and economical factors related to the drug problem by focusing on a purely repressive approach to tackle the issue. However, recent developments in Brazil can illustrate how

law enforcement agencies may adjust their strategies to move away from a purely repressive strategy and focus on reducing the negative aspects related to illicit drug markets, such as violence, corruption, and social breakdown.

The most relevant example for this new focus is that of the Pacifying Police Forces (*Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora*, UPPs). Created in 2008, the UPPs were established as part of a new Federal Government programme within the Ministry of Justice called PRONASCI (*Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania*), a new public security policy which combines law enforcement with actions aiming to tackle the socio-cultural aspects of the illicit drug market. A portion of the programme’s 6.7 billion Brazilian Reais budget (USD 3.9 billion) for the period 2007-2012 is dedicated to combat drug trafficking, and the UPPs are a crucial element of the strategy. The UPPs are military police units that aim to pacify the highest number possible of *favelas* through community policing. The objectives of the UPPs are:

- To regain State control of the communities currently under the influence of criminal groups;
- To bring peace and public security in the *favelas*;
- To contribute to break the ‘logic of war’ in Rio.

This project clearly responds to the need for the police to become more efficient to control crime and restore the rule of law, but also more accountable and responsive to the *favela* communities. The UPPs make it clear, however, that it does not directly aim to end drug trafficking or criminality, to represent a solution for all communities, or to be a solution for all socio-economic problems in Rio.³²

The pacification process consists of a four-step strategy:

- **Step 1: Invasion:** The first (and, for many, necessary) step of the process involves retaking the territories that are under the control of a drug faction. These interventions are conducted by BOPE and consist in highly effective intelligence actions conducted by this special military force.
- **Step 2: Stabilisation:** Instead of invading the territory and withdrawing a few hours later, leaving the *favelas* in the hands of the drug traffickers coming back to their territories of influence, BOPE now remains in the *favelas* for days, and sometimes weeks, until the UPPs take over. During this stabilisation phase, BOPE is in charge of maintaining control over the territory and eliminating the ultimate cells of resistance in the *favela*.

- **Step 3: Occupation:** This is the phase when the UPPs start to operate in the *favelas* and seek to restore law and order through a system of community policing.
- **Step 4: Post-occupation:** This is the last stage of the pacification process, where the UPPs seek to restore and develop a relationship of trust with the community, and establish social and economic programmes in the UPP communities with education and opportunities for employment.

The first *favela* to have been pacified in December 2008 was Santa Marta in Botafogo, a community of 6,000 residents. Since then, eleven communities have been – or are in the process of being – pacified by the UPPs (see table below). A Secretary of Social Assistance and Human Rights (*Secretaria de Assistência Social e Direitos Humanos*, SEASDH) was recently founded to coordinate the work of all relevant stakeholders already active in the *favelas* (such as NGOs,

Table 1. Pacification process in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, December 2009 to July 2010³³

Beginning of pacification	Name of <i>favela</i>	Population size	Number of officers in UPP unit	Population/ UPP officer ratio
19/12/2009	Santa Marta	6,000	123	48.8
16/02/2009	Cidade de Deus	40,000	326	122.7
18/02/2009	Batam	40,000	105	381
10/06/2009	Babilônia, Chapéu Mangeira	6,000	100	60
23/12/2009	Pavão-Pavãozinho, Catagalo	9,500	195	48.7
14/01/2010	Tabajaras, Cabritos	5,000	120	41.7
26/04/2010	Providência	5,000+4,000 (in the surroundings)	200	45
07/06/2010	Borel	20,000	380	52.6
02/07/2010	Formiga	Unknown	90	Unknown
28/07/2010	Andaraí	13,000	229	56.7
30/07/2010 (BOPE occupation)	Salgueiro	4,000	-	-

community groups or schools) in order to improve social services in UPP communities. The work of this body is still underdeveloped and time is needed to assess its real impact on the socio-economic development of the *favelas*, but it is an example of how the government can include its drug strategy into a broader national policy, and collaborate with different actors to implement it.

The UPP model is rather new and only a few studies of its outcomes are available today.³⁴ According to interviews conducted among the communities living in pacified *favelas*, most of the *favela* residents felt that:

- personal security had improved since the pacification process started. They also declared that they had a better image of the military police than before the project was implemented;
- they had more access to State and private services, such as electricity, garbage collection or TV access;
- drug trafficking activities had largely decreased, along with executions and shootouts;
- the UPPs had improved the overall situation in their community.

Several critics have also been raised towards the UPPs, most importantly regarding the issue of migration of crime. Prior to occupying a *favela*, the UPPs announce it publicly, which gives drug traffickers time to hide or flee to another *favela* before the arrival of BOPE. Therefore, while crime may have been reduced in a few of Rio's *favelas*, the levels of violence and trafficking may have increased in some of the other 890 slums. There is currently no evidence for this hypothesis, but it is probable that this is happening. There are also fears that this approach might not be sustainable enough:³⁵ will drug traffickers stay away from the pacified *favelas* once the UPPs have left the

territory? If they decide to come back, how will they react to those residents that have violated the code of silence by 'collaborating' with the police? Will the government provide enough social and security services to the communities, keeping them away from the grasp of the drug traffickers? Will the government provide sufficient funding to the UPPs to enable them to intervene in a sufficient number of *favelas* to impact on the overall scale of the drug market in Rio? Indeed, a study released in 2010 estimated that it would cost about R\$400 million a year, the equivalent of 1% of Rio's gross domestic product, to extend the system of community policing to all of Rio's *favelas*.³⁶ Finally, some critics have been raised regarding the fact that all of the *favelas* that have been pacified so far were under the control of one criminal faction – the *Comando Vermelho*. No clear justification was given for this choice, especially since many *favelas* in the South zone of Rio are under the control of other factions. Some critics have therefore considered the UPPs to be a political tool to benefit certain criminal groups.

Therefore, it seems clear that much more remains to be done in order to impact on drug trafficking in Rio and avoid any policy that might be detrimental to the *favela* dwellers in the long term. However, the UPP project demonstrates that the government is slowly moving away from a purely repressive approach to one that seeks to address the underlying causes of drug trafficking and violence in Rio's *favelas*, including poverty, underemployment, lack of State presence and protection, etc. An interesting element of the strategy is that it is included in a wider government policy promoting socio-economic development in Rio's *favelas*. Several governments in Latin America (among them Colombia) and the Caribbean have shown increasing interest for the UPPs. It is hoped that this strategy will be carried forward after the national elections in October 2010.

Conclusion & Recommendations – A refocused role for law enforcement

The current law enforcement approach adopted by Rio has not been effective in reducing the overall scale of the drug market and the high levels of violence associated with it. In many cases, the adopted strategy has fuelled violence in the *favelas*, creating more security risks, social harms and human rights violations for its inhabitants. It has also filled the prisons with low-level drug dealers, creating overcrowding and gang culture problems. The UPP strategy demonstrates that an alternative way is possible to tackle drug trafficking in Rio by refocusing the role of law enforcement into a more effective force:

- Law enforcement strategies should be reviewed and refocused with a change of objectives, moving away from a singular focus on seizing drugs and arresting and incarcerating low-level offenders, towards a harm reduction approach in partnership with all government departments involved in issues of social and economic development, education, health, etc. This should be accompanied with campaigns to raise awareness on the concept of harm reduction with the public.
- Actions against organised groups should focus on the most harmful aspects of organised criminal groups' individuals and activities rather than solely on seizures and arrests of low-level drug offenders. All law enforcement actions should be designed and implemented in full compliance with the rule of law and human rights.
- Law enforcement strategies against retail markets should be based on good intelligence to assess the dynamics of the local drug market and seek to influence the shape of the market to minimise its consequential harms and related violence.
- New strategies included within the

PRONASCI government policy, particularly the UPP project, should be studied in detail to assess their impact on the drug market and its related harms in Rio.

- There should be lower levels of incarceration of low-level offenders to avoid prison overcrowding, and available resources should be refocused on those individuals that have a true impact on the shape and scale of the illicit drug market. This can be done in several ways:
 - Through the decriminalisation or depenalisation of people caught in possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use. A welcome development in that regard is the decision of the Federal Supreme Court on 1st September 2010. This decision judged unconstitutional the dispositions included in the *Nova Lei de Drogas 11.343/06*, which expressly prohibited the conversion of prison sentences into alternative penalties for individuals condemned for drug trafficking. This decision merely removes a legal impediment – it is now up to the judge to determine what the necessary requirements are to impose these alternative sentences.³⁷
 - Through the imposition of proportionate sentences that distinguish effectively between the different actors in the drug market – drug users, drug dependent individuals, user-dealers, 'mules', enforcers, and leaders.
- Increase salaries, training and education within the police and create punishment mechanisms when police officers commit abuses to reduce tendencies to corruption and impunity. The institutional design of the police curriculum should encourage professional development and recognize the individual talents. Salaries should be compatible with the social relevance of their activities and its risks.
- Integrate all law enforcement institutions

within a unified police operating system at different levels in order to facilitate communication and exchange of information between the different police units and avoid the infiltration of criminal organisations.

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Endnotes

- 1 Anderson Moraes de Castro e Silva, consultant at Viva Rio. He is a sociologist, currently doing a PhD in social science at the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro, UERJ, and has recently written a book on the penitentiary system in Brazil, *Nos Braços da Lei: Uso da Violência Negociada no Interior das Prisões* (2008).
- 2 Marie Nougier, Research and Communications Officer at the International Drug Policy Consortium.
- 3 Viva Rio is a Brazilian non-governmental organisation based in Rio de Janeiro and member of IDPC. Viva Rio aims to promote a culture of peace and social development through field work, research and the formulation of public policies. For more information, please visit Viva Rio's website: www.vivario.org.br.
- 4 The militia are illegal armed groups composed of off-duty police officers, firemen or private security personnel. Beginning in 2006, these groups have decided to free the *favelas* from drug trafficking factions and have started to establish their own rules on the functioning of the *favelas*. Slum dwellers now have to pay for their security and for the other services provided by the militia (such as electricity, gas or TV cable). The militia have sometimes been described as even more cruel than the drug trafficking factions themselves, and are gaining power over an increasing number of *favelas*. In Brähler, V. (2010), 'Avalanches of snow' in *Rio de Janeiro: an analysis of the city's different approaches to combat drug trafficking* (University of London: Unpublished). For more details, please contact v.braehler@hotmail.de
- 5 Dowdney, L. (2003), *Children of the drug trade, a case study of children in organised armed violence in Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: 7 Letras), pp. 24-34
- 6 Athayde *et al*, Ob. Cit. pp.254-263.
- 7 Fernandes, R.C. (2008). Drugs and democracy in Latin America: An introduction (Rio de Janeiro: Viva Rio). http://cbdd.org.br/en/files/2009/11/rubem_fernandes_ingles.pdf.
- 8 Athayde, C., Soares, L.E., Bill, M. V. (2005). *Cabeça de Porco* (Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva), p.255.
- 9 Athayde *et al*, Ob. Cit. pp.254-263.
- 10 Dowdney, L. (2003), *Children of the drug trade, a case study of children in organised armed violence in Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: 7 Letras), p.52
- 11 Amnesty International (2005), 'They come in shooting', AI Index: AMR 19/025/2005
- 12 New generations are rapidly adapting to the way of life dictated by drug traffickers. What was considered as a violation of one's freedoms has now turned into a symbol of status and pride, gained through pleasure and vanity. See: Athayde *et al*. (2005), p.262.
- 13 Downey provides a more detailed explanation of the phenomenon: "Due to faction allegiances between *donos* that control trafficking in different *favelas*, traffickers from other faction-aligned *favela* communities are increasingly employed in positions such as *soldados* [soldiers] or even as the *gerente geral* [general manager]. Before, local dealers would only be from within the *favela* communities in which they worked. The growing number of traffickers from outside the community makes many community members unsettled as they feel that with traffickers from other *favelas* there are no extended kinship ties as are typically found between traffickers from the community and community residents. A lack of such relations makes many community members feel as though they are under occupation by an external force that has less restraint in its dealings with residents." In Dowdney, L. (2003), *Children of the drug trade, a case study of children in organised armed violence in Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: 7 Letras), p.37
- 14 Crack was much cheaper than other drugs available to the users and more easily accessible – between 2008 and 2009, seizures of crack by the police in Rio quintupled. However, crack cocaine also caused more serious harms. See: Aquino, W. (4 November 2009). 'Sob o domínio do crack. Revista 'Isto é', pp. 84-85.
- 15 Drug trafficking remained located in specific areas of the city, but the bonds that had been formed between the traffickers and the communities in which they developed their activities entirely disappeared.
- 16 (19 October 2009). O poderio bélico do tráfico helicóptero da PM pode ter sido derrubado por disparo de munição antiaérea. Jornal 'O Globo', Seção Rio, p.8
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