



LANDING THE BLAME OVERFISHING IN THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC 2020

UNCOVERING THE EU
MEMBER STATES MOST
RESPONSIBLE FOR
SETTING FISHING
QUOTAS ABOVE
SCIENTIFIC ADVICE

Fisheries ministers are risking the sustainability of fish stocks by consistently setting fishing limits above scientific advice. This is our sixth and final year running a series of briefings to identify which Member States are standing in the way of more fish, more profits, and more jobs for European citizens.

Food for an additional 89 million EU citizens. An extra €1.6 billion in annual revenue. Over 20,000 new jobs across the continent. Far from being a pipe dream, all of this could be a reality if we paid more attention to one of Europe's most significant natural resources – our seas.¹ If EU waters were properly managed – with damaged fish stocks rebuilt above levels that could support their maximum sustainable yield (MSY) – we could enjoy their full potential within a generation.²

FISHING LIMITS VS SCIENTIFIC ADVICE

Every year, fisheries ministers have an opportunity to make this a reality when they agree on a total allowable catch (TAC) for commercial fish stocks. Scientific bodies, predominantly the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), provide information about the state of most stocks and recommend maximum catch levels.³ Yet overfishing continues as this scientific advice goes unheeded.

Our historical analysis of agreed TACs for EU waters between 2001 and 2019 shows that, on average, six out of 10 TACs were set above scientific

TABLE 1. THE OVERFISHING LEAGUE TABLE.

Member State	Minister/Representative	Excess TAC (%)	Excess TAC (Tonnes)
Sweden	Per Callenberg	32.5%	12,006
Denmark	Mogens Jensen	6.1%	20,217
France	Didier Guillaume	6.1%	17,117
Ireland	Michael Creed	4.0%	7,300
Belgium	Hilde Crevits	2.4%	730
Spain	Luis Planas Puchades	2.4%	5,958
United Kingdom	George Eustice	2.1%	12,207
Germany	Julia Klöckner	1.0%	1,267
Portugal	Ricardo Serrão Santos	0.9%	970
Netherlands	Ronald Van Roeden	0.6%	1,550

Note: Member States with fewer than five comparable TACs have been excluded to avoid an over-attribution of the results from a small number of decisions for a minor party.

advice. While the percentage by which TACs were set above advice declined throughout this period (from 39% to 10% in all EU waters), the proportion of TACs set above advice has had a lesser decline, from eight out of 10 TACs to five out of 10.⁴

The reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) that entered into force in 2014 aims to restore and maintain populations of fish stocks above levels capable of supporting MSY. The corresponding exploitation rate was to be achieved by 2015 where possible and by 2020 at the latest for all stocks.⁵ As this series of briefings has documented, scientific advice on fishing limits to achieve this deadline has not been followed. The 2020 fishing limits were no exception. If Member States use the fishing limits allocated to them, then MSY will not be reached and the CFP will have failed to reach its sustainability deadline.

AGREEMENTS BEHIND CLOSED DOORS

The negotiations over TACs are held by the Agriculture and Fisheries configuration of the EU Council of Ministers. These negotiations are not public; only their outcomes are. This lack of transparency means that ministers are not on the hook when they ignore scientific advice and give priority to short-term interests that risk the health of fish stocks.

This briefing, a continuation of the *Landing the Blame* series, reveals which Member States and ministers are behind decisions that go against the EU's long-term interests. This conclusion is reached by analysing the outcomes of the negotiations and calculating which Member States end up with TACs above scientific advice. The key assumption is that these Member States are the main drivers of overfishing, either because they have been actively pushing for fishing limits to be set above scientific advice, or they have failed to prevent such limits being put in place.

The NGO ClientEarth has used Access to Information Requests (AIRs) to retrieve information on the stated positions of Member States in these negotiations.⁶ Together, the outcome-based approach used in this briefing series and the position-based approach in the ClientEarth analysis provide strong evidence of Member State responsibility.

THE 2020 NORTHEAST ATLANTIC TACS

During the December 2019 negotiations, ministers set the TACs for the majority of commercial EU fish species for 2020 – the final opportunity to set sustainable fishing limits and meet the 2020 MSY deadline. This analysis covers 120 TAC decisions made (or confirmed) at this meeting.⁷

Where comparable scientific advice was available, 52 TACs were set above advice, amounting to 79,300 tonnes of excess TAC. This continues the trend of permitting overfishing in EU waters with Northeast Atlantic TACs set 4% above scientific advice on average – a decrease from the 2019 TACs (10%).⁸ The earlier negotiations for the 2020 Baltic Sea and deep sea TACs were also set above scientific advice, with 6 out of 10 and 8 out of 12 TACs exceeding advice, respectively.^{9,10}

For the 2020 Northeast Atlantic TACs, Sweden, Denmark, and France top the league table of Member States with the highest percentage of their TAC in excess of scientific advice (Table 1). These Member States were involved with TAC decisions that allow fishing at 32%, 6%, and 6%, respectively, above scientific advice. Sweden also topped the 2019 overfishing league from last year’s analysis.

These three Member States, along with the UK, are also the worst offenders in terms of the total tonnage of TAC set above advice. Ministers representing these Member States received the largest TAC increases above scientific advice in terms of tonnes and are therefore the most responsible for impeding the transition to sustainable fisheries in the EU.

Sweden tops the league table with 12,006 tonnes of quota above scientific advice – equal to 32%. The vast majority of this excess TAC is due to herring in Skagerrak and the Kattegat (with cod and whiting in the same areas also contributing). Had the herring TAC followed scientific advice Sweden's excess TAC would be less than 1%. Sweden shares this herring TAC with Denmark in roughly equal proportions but because Sweden has much fewer TACs in the Northeast Atlantic than Denmark, the excess TAC is a larger percentage. By volume and value, the TACs in the Baltic Sea are much more important for Sweden. The Swedish minister responsible for fisheries, Jennie Nilsson, did not attend the negotiations; Per Callenberg, State Secretary to the Minister, represented Sweden in her stead.

In ClientEarth AIRs, the ‘Council Bible’ of positions in the 2020 Northeast Atlantic TACs reveals that Sweden supported the MSY by the 2020 deadline and was one of the few Member States to support additional conservation measures in the TAC regulation itself.

The herring TACs, like the others in Skagerrak and Kattegat, were set in the Norway Agreement and then confirmed at the December Council. The

FIGURE 1. EXCESS TAC IN THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC BY EU MEMBER STATE




FIGURE 2. EXCESS TAC 2001–2020.





FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF TACS ABOVE ICES ADVICE.



European Commission proposed the high TAC that was accepted with no change. The only comments received from Member States in this area were on the banking and borrowing provision for cod, not the level of the TAC itself.

Analysing ICES advice and excess TAC by Member State illustrates that excess TAC is not just a function of the total amount of fishing a Member State carries out (Figure 1). If that were the case,

then each Member State’s excess total TAC would be proportional to its total advice. Instead, we see a spectrum of excess TAC percentages, with some Member States frequently towards the top or bottom of these annual calculations. Although this does not prove that the worst offending Member States are pushing for higher TACs (that would require greater transparency around the negotiations), it is consistent with this thesis.

2020 IN CONTEXT

The percentage of excess TAC set during the Northeast Atlantic negotiations fell in 2020 (Figure 2), also pushing up the excess TACs for all regions combined. The high correlation between the Northeast Atlantic and overall TACs stems from the high number of TACs set for the Northeast Atlantic region. This shows that ensuring sustainability in Northeast Atlantic fisheries is paramount to ending overfishing in the EU overall.

The number of TACs above advice across all regions increased slightly in the setting of the 2020 TACs with 68 out of 136, or 50% (Figure 3). To fulfil the CFP's objectives, the number of excess TACs would need to be at zero.

The full ICES and Council dataset used for the analysis in this briefing is available online on the New Economics Foundation website for download and further analysis.¹¹

DISCUSSION

The results of this analysis reveal insufficient progress towards fishing in line with scientific advice. As long as ministers delay bringing fishing rates to sustainable levels, stocks will not deliver their maximum sustainable yield, costing revenue and jobs in the long run. The failure to reach the CFP 2020 deadline now looks inevitable if the excess TACs that have been agreed are used in the coming fishing season.

There are several issues related to the Northeast Atlantic TAC negotiations that are worth describing in detail.

MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS

Historically, ministers have emerged from the closed-door TAC negotiations proclaiming to the fishing industry and to the media that they have fought hard and secured additional fishing quota for their national fleet. Scientific advice was something to be fought against, not followed.¹²

In recent years, as the 2020 MSY deadline approached, there has been a change in tone, with ministers speaking more about the progress that had been made and the need to delay TAC reductions rather than avoid them entirely.

This year's negotiations saw a continuation of another change in tone (first evident in 2019), even if the results show only a modest change. Now it is more common for ministers to make statements that infer that they negotiated on behalf of sustainability and science while omitting the details to assess such claims.

George Eustice, Fisheries Minister for the UK, mentioned responding to science to "conserve stocks": "This year there has been some very challenging science for cod stocks in many parts of the North East Atlantic and we have responded to conserve stocks."¹³

Irish agriculture and fishing minister Michael Creed referred to a "sustainable way" of fishing: "Council agreed measures that will deliver the necessary protections for cod and whiting while still allowing vessels to continue fishing in a sustainable way." The minister also commented on the CFP deadline, noting that there is movement "towards the objective":

"Since the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, we have been working steadily towards the objective of setting quotas in line with Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) by 2020. However, this is not the end of this journey. We must continue to build on the progress we have made to secure a sustainable future for our fishing industry and the coastal communities which depend upon it."¹⁴

Inferring sustainability while not actually following scientific advice is dangerous doublespeak. No one believes the CFP has been met given the results, as explained by the Chair of the European Parliament's Fisheries Committee, Chris Davies:

"The Common Fisheries Policy agreed seven years ago called for all stocks to be fished sustainably by 2020. No one is claiming now that this goal will be achieved. Achieving maximum sustainable yield is not open to political compromise; you either do it or you don't. We need to invest in obtaining scientific advice about more stocks and we must not try to second guess the scientists."¹⁵

Pressure to act sustainably has changed the tone of the discourse around fishing limits, but as long as this disconnect between words and actions persists, the success in changing tone means very little.

MANAGING SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS THROUGH A JUST TRANSITION

That TACs should be set in line with scientific advice is clear from the text of the CFP. Article 2 states that “the maximum sustainable yield exploitation rate shall be achieved by 2015 where possible and, on a progressive and incremental basis at the least by 2020 for all stocks.”¹⁶ Delays to achieving MSY past 2015 was only to be allowed “if achieving the exploitation rates by 2015 would seriously jeopardise the social and economic sustainability of the fishing fleets involved” (Recital 7).¹⁷

While the scope of the analysis conducted here is to find where scientific advice has not been followed, it is possible that some of these increases can be justified for socio-economic reasons. To date however, the Council has produced no documentation of socio-economic necessity in support of their decisions, and the 2020 Northeast Atlantic TACs were no exception.

Some Member States have sought to provide socio-economic evidence, but what has been produced (at least publicly) is a simple multiplication of the change in TAC by the price of the catch. This form of analysis is not only simplistic but extremely one-sided. By definition, a higher TAC will always be the optimal outcome. A policy that is designed to remove fish stocks needs to be evaluated over a multi-year time period. It should also consider the current financial performance of fleets (ie viability analysis) and important variables like quota uptake and price elasticity.

Studies of fish stock recovery pathways show that the faster the transition to sustainable fishing the better, as the net present value is higher the greater the number of years producing MSY.^{18,19} Greater benefits have also been found from fishing at the lower end of MSY ranges compared to the upper end.^{20,21,22}

Fish populations suffer multiple pressures, including overfishing, agricultural runoff, ocean heating, and acidification. Fishing pressure is a factor that fisheries ministers can control directly to make fish populations more resilient. The process of reducing fishing pressure should be an evidence-based just transition.²³ Ministers have a range of policy options available to determine

how the impact of this transition is felt by fishers, for example through changes to quota allocation or fishing labour policies.²⁴ There are also funds available to fishers affected by fishing closures through the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund.²⁵

TACS SET WITH THIRD COUNTRIES

Several important TACs are negotiated with third countries through bilateral negotiations with Norway and coastal states negotiations.* The outcomes of these negotiations were confirmed at the December Council.

Due in part to a constant threat of parties leaving the negotiating table and setting a unilateral TAC, these negotiations have a history of departing from scientific advice by a significant margin. Fortunately, this trend did not manifest in 2020 with the Coastal States agreement following scientific advice and the Norway agreement matching the EU Council for excess TAC (5% and 4%, respectively).

The prospect of the UK becoming an independent coastal state with the ability to set unilateral TACs is therefore a serious challenge to the setting of TACs – for all parties cumulatively – in line with scientific advice.²⁶ This is made even more alarming by statements from UK politicians about increasing the UK’s share of TACs while the EU is resolute about not decreasing its own share.

LIMITS VS CATCHES

It should be noted that the amount of fish caught is rarely the entirety of the agreed quota. For economic and biological reasons, fishing may fall under the quota whereas illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing may push fishing pressure above the agreed limit. Rather than analysing fishing pressure, this series of briefings specifically analyses the policy intent of the Council of Ministers.

A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN COUNCIL MEETINGS

Under Article 3 of the reformed CFP, transparency is mentioned as one of the CFP’s principles of

* The other states in the coastal state negotiations are Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and Russia in addition to Norway.

good governance, yet the secretive negotiations undermine this principle and make the process less open to scrutiny. This study is therefore also limited in what it can achieve, as data shortages prevent a comprehensive analysis. Member States that top the league table for excess TAC should therefore be major advocates of increased transparency, if judging performance by outcomes is insufficient.

A 2017 investigation by Corporate Europe Observatory revealed some that fishing industry lobbyists have used press passes to access the EU Council building during crucial ministerial negotiations on fishing quotas.²⁷ Perhaps not surprisingly, the fishing industry lobbyists were representing fleets from Member States near the top of the Landing the Blame league table for the Northeast Atlantic TACs (Spain and the Netherlands).²⁸

A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN TAC DETERMINATION FROM ICES ADVICE

Mirroring the difficulties with transparency around the Council negotiations is the issue of how the TACs were determined. Ideally, this exercise of comparing ICES advice and TACs should be a straightforward process that can be easily scrutinised. This is possible with the right request to ICES but is currently far from what is practised.

Data on international TAC agreements are difficult to find, making it hard to properly apportion responsibility for overfishing. As a result, TACs had to be assembled from press releases after the negotiations concluded, but a more official and finalised source would aid this important analysis. Moreover, mismatches between the EU's reported TACs and reported bilateral agreements published on the Commission's online page make it difficult to establish exact quotas.^{29,30} Using data compiled from *Landing the Blame: Overfishing in EU Waters 2001–2015*, the third-country share of TACs was calculated by taking an average of the difference between total TAC and EU TAC in years where both were reported.

Matching ICES and TAC zones is also a perennial issue that could and should be resolved.³¹

All these required inputs for determining TACs from ICES advice should be made publicly

available, in the interests of transparency and access to information. This is the only way for civil society to properly hold representatives to account.

THE LANDING OBLIGATION

Since 1 January 2019, the landing obligation has come into full force. It requires fishing vessels to land all their catch in an effort to reduce waste and unaccounted fishing mortality. This year, for the second time, ICES advice on catch limits is compared with the TAC that has been set; previously, the ICES advice on landings was compared with TAC before top-ups were added. Note that some vessels under the landing obligation continue to be given exemptions that allow them to discard given quantities of fish, if it is not feasible to reduce discards or when discarded fish are likely to survive (so-called *de minimis* exemptions).³² It is unclear how these exemptions were calculated, but a ClientEarth AIR revealed the deductions used by the European Commission in a working paper for their TAC proposal. These percentages were applied to the ICES advice in this analysis. The lack of transparency around these deductions complicates this analysis and makes it increasingly difficult for civil society to hold decision makers to account.

DEADLINE BREACHED

Article 2.2 of the CFP calls for fish stocks to be rebuilt to levels that can support the MSY "by 2015 where possible and, on a progressive, incremental basis at the latest by 2020 for all stocks". This is a legally binding commitment that Member States made in the reformed CFP, but at the current rate it will take at least another decade to meet the sustainability deadline.³³ Environmental lawyers are now considering legal action.³⁴

Whether the deadline will be reached depends on catches of fish (and the associated stock mortality) rather than fishing limits themselves. This distinction is unlikely to be important unless Member States hold back some of the TACs that have been agreed. But three months into 2020 there are no signs of this happening.

By failing to reach the 2020 deadline, fishing ministers have missed out creating a fishery with more abundant fish populations as well as increasing jobs and incomes. Missing the deadline

also risks the credibility of EU policy in fisheries and beyond.³⁵ For the future of sustainable fisheries and the meaning of EU policy, much has already been lost and will continue if the problem of excess TAC continues.

This is the final briefing in the *Landing the Blame* series comparing the agreed TACs with scientific advice. To end the project, in the coming months NEF will be working with ClientEarth to combine the outcome-based results here with the process-based results from AIRs. The *Landing the Blame* briefings and dataset will continue to be hosted online for all to use.

ANNEX

ATLANTIC TACS COMPARED TO SCIENTIFIC ADVICE (TONNES)

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Anchovy	8	31,892	31,892	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Anglerfish	8c, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	4,196	4,196	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Anglerfish	Union waters of 2a and 4	13,077	14,085	1,008	8%	36	79	7	38	0	27	0	0	1	820
Anglerfish	Norwegian waters of 4	1,578	1,700	122	8%	4	93	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	22
Anglerfish	6; Union and international waters of 5b; international waters of 12 and 14	7,401	7,971	570	8%	20	0	252	23	57	20	0	22	0	176
Anglerfish	7	35,299	35,299	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Anglerfish	8a, 8b, 8d and 8e	9,458	9,458	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue ling	Union and international waters of 5b, 6, 7	10,750	10,750	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue ling	International waters of 12	0	137	137	-100%	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	132	0	1
Blue ling	Union and international waters of 2 and 4	0	32	32	-100%	0	2	15	2	2	0	0	0	0	9
Blue ling	Union and international waters of 3a	0	5	5	-100%	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0
Blue whiting	8c, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	44,757	44,757	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue whiting	Union and international waters of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8a, 8b, 8d, 8e, 12 and 14	326,484	326,484	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue whiting	Faroese waters	2,539	2,539	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue whiting	Norwegian waters of 2 and 4	0	0	0	-100%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Boarfish	Union and international waters of 6, 7 and 8	19,152	19,152	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Capelin	2b	0	0	0	-100%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cod	4; Union waters of 2a; that part of 3a not covered by the Skagerrak and Kattegat	9,457	12,216	2,759	29%	98	564	121	358	0	319	0	0	4	1,295
Cod	Kattegat	0	130	130	-100%	0	80	0	2	0	0	0	0	48	0
Cod	Skagerrak	1,575	2,035	460	29%	1	380	0	9	0	2	0	0	66	0
Cod	6b; Union and international waters of 5b west of 12° 00' Wand of 12 and 14	14	74	60	429%	0	0	10	1	13	0	0	0	0	36

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Cod	6a; Union and international waters of 5b east of 12° 00' W	0	1,279	1,279	-100%	2	0	203	19	284	0	0	0	0	771
Cod	7a	116	257	141	122%	2	0	5	0	93	1	0	0	0	41
Cod	7b, 7c, 7e-k, 8, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	0	805	805	-100%	18	0	294	0	461	0	0	0	0	32
Cod	7d	664	858	194	29%	8	0	163	0	0	5	0	0	0	18
Common sole	3a; Union waters of Subdivisions 22-24	539	539	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	7h, 7j and 7k	213	329	116	54%	10	0	19	0	52	16	0	0	0	19
Common sole	Union waters of 2a and 4	17,535	17,535	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	7a	561	457	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	7b and 7c	24	42	18	75%	0	0	3	0	15	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	7d	2,846	2,797	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	7e	1,478	1,478	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	7f and 7g	1,686	1,686	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	8a and 8b	3,768	3,768	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greater silver smelt	Union and international waters of 1 and 2	53	90	37	70%	0	0	3	10	0	8	0	0	0	16
Greater silver smelt	Union waters of 3a and 4	724	1,234	510	70%	0	452	3	5	3	21	0	0	18	8
Haddock	3a	2,101	2,101	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	Union and international waters of 6b, 12 and 14	10,472	10,472	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	Union and international waters of 5b and 6a	3,973	3,973	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	4; Union waters of 2a	27,752	27,753	1	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Haddock	7b-k, 8,9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	16,671	11,418	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	7a	3,156	3,156	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hake	3a	3,138	3,403	265	8%	0	244	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	0
Hake	8c, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	6,615	8,991	2,376	36%	0	0	146	0	0	0	710	1,520	0	0
Hake	Union waters of 2a and 4	3,633	3,940	307	8%	4	177	39	20	0	10	0	0	0	55
Hake	6 and 7; Union and international waters of 5b; international waters of 12 and 14	58,393	63,325	4,932	8%	45	0	2,245	0	272	29	0	1,454	0	886
Hake	8a, 8b, 8d and 8e	39,599	42,944	3,345	8%	1	0	2,311	0	0	3	0	1,029	0	0

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Herring	4, 7d and Union waters of 2a (by-catches)	11,324	8,954	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	3a (by-catches)	0	6,659	6,659	-100%	0	5,692	0	51	0	0	0	0	916	0
Herring	Union, Faroese, Norwegian and international waters of 1 and 2	34,216	34,216	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	Union and international waters of 5b, 6b and 6aN	0	3,480	3,480	-100%	0	0	74	389	526	389	0	0	0	2,102
Herring	Union and Norwegian waters of 4 north of 53° 30' N	250,918	230,755	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	3a	0	21,257	21,257	-100%	0	10,309	0	165	0	0	0	0	10,783	0
Herring	4c, 7d (by-catches)	46,052	42,351	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	Norwegian waters south of 62° N	1,031	948	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	6aS, 7b, 7c	0	1,360	1,360	-100%	0	0	0	0	1,236	124	0	0	0	0
Herring	7a	8,064	8,064	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	7g, 7h, 7j and 7k	0	869	869	-100%	0	0	54	10	751	54	0	0	0	1
Horse mackerel	Union waters of 2a, 4a; 6, 7a-c, 7e-k, 8a, 8b, 8d and 8e; Union and international waters of 5b; international waters of 12 and 14	70,838	70,838	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Horse mackerel	Union waters of 4b, 4c and 7d	11,417	11,417	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Horse mackerel	9	116,871	116,871	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Horse mackerel	8c	11,474	11,474	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lemon sole and witch flounder	Union waters of 2a and 4	5,930	6,785	855	14%	46	128	35	16	0	106	0	0	1	522
Ling	Union and international waters of 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 14	9,101	12,196	3,095	34%	12	2	909	42	228	0	2	853	0	1,047
Ling	3a	134	179	45	34%	3	26	0	3	0	0	0	0	10	3
Ling	Union waters of 4	3,162	4,237	1,075	34%	7	108	60	66	0	2	0	0	5	827
Mackerel	Norwegian waters of 2a and 4a	14,453	14,453	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mackerel	3a and 4; Union waters of 2a, 3b, 3c and Subdivisions 22-32	32,022	32,022	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Mackerel	6, 7, 8a, 8b, 8d and 8e; Union and international waters of 5b; international waters of 2a, 12 and 14	368,031	368,031	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mackerel	8c, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	42,112	42,112	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megrim	7	18,184	19,093	909	5%	25	0	331	0	151	0	0	273	0	130
Megrim	Union waters of 2a and 4	2,922	2,922	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megrim	Union and international waters of 5b; 6; international waters of 12 and 14	5,901	5,901	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megrim	8a, 8b, 8d and 8e	1,798	1,888	90	5%	0	0	40	0	0	0	0	50	0	0
Megrim	8c, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	2,419	2,419	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northern prawn	3a	3,380	2,366	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northern prawn	Union waters of 2a and 4	0	1,200	1,200	-100%	0	891	0	0	0	9	0	0	36	264
Norway lobster	7	19,590	16,815	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	8c	0	3	3	-100%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
Norway lobster	Union waters of 2a and 4	24,902	23,002	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	3a	19,904	13,733	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	6; Union and international waters of 5b	16,603	15,899	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	8a, 8b, 8d and 8e	6,573	3,886	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	386	386	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway pout	3a; Union waters of 2a and 4	65,000	65,000	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	Skagerrak	16,655	16,655	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	Kattegat	1,606	1,141	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	7a	3,299	3,299	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	4; Union waters of 2a; that part of 3a not covered by the Skagerrak and the Kattegat	89,728	89,728	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	7b and 7c	24	74	50	208%	0	0	7	0	43	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	7d and 7e	11,529	11,529	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	7f and 7g	2,295	2,295	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	7h, 7j and 7k	0	67	67	-100%	4	0	8	0	30	17	0	0	0	8

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Plaice	8, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	155	355	200	129%	0	0	134	0	0	0	33	33	0	0
Pollack	7	3,296	12,163	8,867	269%	276	0	6,352	0	677	0	0	17	0	1,546
Pollack	8c	121	208	87	72%	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	78	0	0
Pollack	6; Union and international waters of 5b; international waters of 12 and 14	64	238	174	269%	0	0	83	0	25	0	0	2	0	63
Pollack	8a, 8b, 8d and 8e	862	1,482	620	72%	0	0	514	0	0	0	0	105	0	0
Pollack	9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	148	254	106	72%	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	103	0	0
Redfish	Union and international waters of 5; international waters of 12 and 14 (shallow pelagic)	0	0	0	-100%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Redfish	Union and international waters of 5; international waters of 12 and 14 (deep pelagic)	6,733	850	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saithe	3a and 4; Union waters of 2a	38,110	38,110	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saithe	6; Union and international waters of 5b, 12 and 14	7,340	7,340	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sole	8c, 8d, 8e, 9 and 10; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	502	858	356	71%	0	0	0	0	0	0	222	134	0	0
Sprat	7d and 7e	1,506	1,506	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spurdog/dogfish	Union and international waters of 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 14	0	270	270	-100%	20	0	83	4	53	0	0	10	0	100
Turbot and brill	Union waters of 2a and 4	6,208	6,865	657	11%	48	103	12	26	0	365	0	0	1	102
Whiting	3a	312	1,295	983	315%	0	885	0	0	0	3	0	0	95	0
Whiting	7a	0	721	721	-100%	2	0	25	0	415	0	0	0	0	279
Whiting	8	2,276	2,625	349	15%	0	0	209	0	0	0	0	140	0	0
Whiting	4; Union waters of 2a	19,796	15,382	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whiting	6; Union and international waters of 5b; international waters of 12 and 14	9	937	928	10311%	0	0	56	3	270	0	0	0	0	598
Whiting	7b, 7c, 7d, 7e, 7f, 7g, 7h, 7j and 7k	6,481	10,863	4,382	68%	37	0	2,277	0	1,643	19	0	0	0	407
Total		2,167,106	2,188,693	79,322	130	730	20,217	17,117	1,267	7,300	1,550	970	5,958	12,006	12,207

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