



# THE ALLIANCE AND NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- **The US-Australia alliance in the 21st century is now situated within a complex interplay of emerging regional security architectures in Asia.**
- **'Non-traditional security' extends the traditional concept of security to include a variety of referent objects and issues such as resource security, environmental security, food security, energy security and health security.**
- **The Alliance should continue to adapt to new models of regional security arrangements in order to deal with non-traditional security challenges.**

Threats to security can no longer be solely defined in military and statist terms. In widening and deepening the security calculus, 'non-traditional security' encapsulates a variety of issues, critiques of orthodox security approaches, and alternative security problematics. Both Australia and the US now recognize non-traditional security in their national security statements to varying degrees. The non-traditional security agenda is now chiefly constituted of issues including climate change, cyber security and terrorism. Recent AUSMIN talks have also produced formal, Alliance-based cooperation on issues such as space security and cyber security. As the security environment continues to change and become more complex, both regional cooperation and regional engagement must be strengthened. The US-Australia alliance should enhance its collective capacity to make practical contributions to bilateral and regional security.

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## **Alliances are marriages of convenience rather than permanent bonds of affection and thus are susceptible to major change.<sup>1</sup>**

## **The quality of our alliance and scope of our diplomatic partnership shine brightly. We both face a rapidly evolving security order defined by traditional and non-traditional security problems.<sup>2</sup>**

Non-traditional security (NTS) – or non-traditional threats to security – is a broad concept that captures variously an agenda of issues, a critique of orthodox approaches to security, and an alternative security problematic. As the discussion here indicates, non-traditional security concerns have come to feature on the individual security agenda of both Australia and the United States. It is not surprising, then, that this has spilled over into the Alliance dialogue process. Nevertheless, there is as yet little coherence or clarity in the way that the Alliance partners have addressed NTS challenges as part of their bilateral cooperation or as a pivot point for regional engagement. The extent to which the Alliance can or should continue to accommodate NTS is in considerable measure a function of differing views on what the Alliance actually is or should be in the 21st century – a ‘state-state military arrangement’<sup>3</sup> or a diplomatic arrangement and friendship that sits within a ‘complex interplay of emerging regional security architectures in Asia’.<sup>4</sup> I incline to the latter. While the ANZUS treaty remains a foundational framework – as evidenced in AUSMIN communiqué and statements – the contours of the Alliance as a statement of bilateral friendship and commitment have moved well beyond the confines of a 60+ year old agreement. Indeed, both partners recognize that the Alliance serves to advance security as well as defence interests, and that those security interests are no longer defined only in traditional terms of armed attack and common danger. Richard Haass, then Director of Policy Planning for the US Department of State, noted in a speech at the University of Sydney in June 2001 that ‘the Alliance is much more than a military relationship, and its significance extends well-beyond traditional security interests’.<sup>5</sup> The 2013 Australian National Security Strategy reinforces this view, observing that the value of the Alliance goes

beyond defence aspects to include the way that it has ‘continuously evolved to maintain a contemporary focus and addressing emerging threats’.<sup>6</sup>

In light of this, two related arguments inform this paper. First, non-traditional security (in both its narrow and broad terms) should be taken seriously by both countries under the dialogue umbrella of the Alliance relationship. The issues themselves are important ones on the regional and global agenda and they are central to the continued relevance of the Alliance. Second, if NTS issues are to be addressed not just seriously but also successfully in terms of Australian and US individual and shared security objectives, the Alliance has to be understood as and function not just as a bilateral treaty delivering private goods to the two countries but as part of a broader patchwork of regional security arrangements in which Australia and the US have special interest.

This paper is structured as follows. It begins with a short introduction to non-traditional security, followed by an overview of how the two Alliance partners have woven NTS challenges into their own security themes. The third section focuses specifically on NTS in the Alliance relationship, exploring this first in bilateral terms and then as a function of the Alliance partners determination to engage with regional Asia Pacific security concerns. The final section offers some thoughts on policy proposals with respect to NTS in the Alliance.

### **Non-traditional Security**

While the focus of a think piece such as this is intended to be future looking, a brief recap of the global and regional context for NTS is warranted: understanding

how we got here sets the scene for where we might anticipate going. The political changes that accompanied the winding-down and then the end of the Cold War, and the growing impact of globalisation in its economic, political, social and environmental manifestations, provided the context for a re-examination of what security might mean, how it might be achieved, and to whom the responsibility for providing security should fall. In the face of asymmetric and networked non-state threats, intra-state conflict and state failure, and extremes of wealth, poverty and disadvantage, academics and policymakers alike were impelled to re-examine what it meant to be secure. In response to the questions 'security for whom and from what', security came to be defined variously as protection against existential threats, as freedom from fear and harm, and as human survival. In response to the question 'security by what means', states and governments looked beyond military capacity, deterrence and collective defence arrangements to strategies that could anticipate non-military risks and vulnerabilities and support preventative action across a suite of policy and issue areas.

The 'non-traditional' component of this re-evaluation is, at one level, seemingly straightforward. Traditional threats had long been defined primarily in military and statist terms: threats to states of actual or potential invasion or incursion; political destabilisation supported by enemy states; expansionist tendencies embedded in competing ideologies; and fears of instability or threats to vaguely defined national interests in the face of military modernisation, arms race or conflict in areas of geographic strategic interest. The traditional security goal is therefore understood as the maintenance of order and stability and the protection (or securing) of those values that are associated with statehood: political independence, territorial integrity and internal order. The instruments of security ranged, then, across military strength and modernisation, deterrence, self-defence, and alliances.

In a widening and deepening of the security calculus, threats other than war and military aggression became more prominent. This new security agenda – variously termed transnational security, non-conventional security, and non-military security as well as non-traditional security – was motivated first by concerns with intra-state political violence with a high potential for social instability, destabilisation of

borders and 'spill-over'. In the face of an increasingly globalised political economy, policy-makers also became concerned about maintaining access to and control over sources of national economic security, or at least minimising challenges that could undermine economic stability. As a result, the security lexicon expanded to include (among others) resource security, environmental security, food security, energy security, and health security. A growing emphasis on comprehensive and cooperative security strategies – particularly prominent in the Asia Pacific – and a revitalising in the UN system of concerns about threats to international peace and security, suggested that traditional 'self-regarding' models of national security were no longer sufficient (if indeed they ever had been) to overcome the insecurities and vulnerabilities of a globalised world.

Academic efforts to trace and categorise the multiplier effect of the kinds of instabilities embodied in what Thomas Homer-Dixon described as simple scarcity and 'relative deprivation' conflicts were taken up rather quickly in the policy and journalist community.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps the most pessimistic example is found in Robert Kaplan's projections about likely national security issues of the early twenty-first century. Kaplan argued that: [t]he political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh—developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts—will be the core foreign policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate'.<sup>8</sup>

Somewhat less dystopian views are expressed in the 2004 report of the UN Secretary General's High Level Panel (HLP) on Threats, Challenges and Changes. The Panel confirmed a more complex contemporary and mostly non-traditional (in security agenda of poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation, war

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and violence within States, the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism, and transnational organized crime. It anticipated – indeed required – a consensus on a new collective security system that would take prevention seriously and recognise shared responsibility for each other’s security. Finally, the report argued that the contemporary agenda of threats undermines not just state security but also human security, arguing that the two are, in fact, closely and inextricably linked.

## Human Security

As suggested above, much of the widening of the post-Cold War security agenda focused on non-traditional threats to traditional state referents (the ‘for whom’ part of the security calculation). The deepening of security, on the other hand, was accompanied by and reinforced by concerns about non-traditional referents, captured most prominently in the concept of human security. The genesis of the human security approach lies in ideas articulated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 Human Development Report but with a genealogy that can be traced at least to the two reports of the Brandt Commission, *North–South: A Programme for Survival* published in 1980 and *Common Crisis* (1983). The UNDP argued that human security was both a universal, people-centred concern with ‘human life and dignity’ and an antidote to conventional views of security that had ‘for too long ... been shaped by the potential for conflict between states ... [and] equated with ... threats to a country’s borders’.<sup>9</sup> The independent Commission on Human Security (CHS), established by an initiative of the government of Japan but reporting to the UN Secretary-General, identified a range of orchestrated and inadvertent menaces to the security of people and communities – those that emanate from the state, loss of freedom, violence, abuse of human rights, poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and statelessness.

The 2003 report of the CHS and subsequent UN Secretary General’s reports on human security have echoed the UNDP theme of some kind of security paradigm shift. This anticipates security strategies that focus on empowerment as well as

protection, and prevention as well as reaction. It adds to more traditional security concerns about ‘freedom from fear’ the agenda of freedom from want and, more recently, freedom to live in dignity. The human security agenda – and indeed the concept itself – is increasingly recognized as a ‘means to help limit the recurrence of threats and prevent their expansion into broader and more intractable crises’ such as those that challenge the individual and shared security of states.<sup>10</sup>

## Moves Towards NTS

Both Australia and the US have made non-traditional security a theme in their national security statements although this has been more explicit for Australia than for the US. The Australian government’s 2012 policy paper on Australia in the Asian Century included a full chapter on building what it called sustainable security in the region. The government was explicit in recognizing ‘security in a broad sense’;<sup>11</sup> pointing to the importance of comprehensive national, collective and human security. The 2013 National Security Statement included ‘global challenges’ (resource scarcity, climate change, changing demographics, increasing urbanization, and corruption and cyber insecurity) as central themes in the government’s national security outlook. In this context, defence is one component only of a broader security canvas. Stephen Smith, Australia’s defence minister, has used the term non-traditional security a number of times in this way although not always shedding much light on what he (or his speech writers) thinks it is.<sup>12</sup> He also made mention of non-traditional security concerns during his time as Minister for Foreign Affairs in speeches to the Confederation of Indian Industries and CSCAP’s regional security issues forum for example.<sup>13</sup> So did Kevin Rudd during his time in the role,<sup>14</sup> in something of an advance on the terminology of ‘soft’ security that characterized his earlier commentary.<sup>15</sup> This is not just a Labor preference. Alexander Downer was not averse to referring to non-traditional security during his time as Australia’s Foreign Minister.<sup>16</sup>

Non-traditional security issues have also been explicit in a range of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral security arrangements in which Australia is engaged. The 1997 Joint Declaration on relations between Australia and the European Union referred

to non-military threats 'such as terrorism, the fight against organised crime, and the illicit trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances'.<sup>17</sup> DFAT's summary of the 2007 Australia- Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation refers to 'ground-breaking activities in ... non-traditional security sectors' including 'peace building and disaster relief ... [and] combating international crimes including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illicit drugs and money laundering'.<sup>18</sup> The Declaration quite specifically refers to disaster relief and pandemics – described elsewhere by Australia and Japan as 'non-traditional security' – as human security concerns, and strengthening human security is a specific purpose of their bilateral cooperation.<sup>19</sup> As Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith described the 2008 Lombok-Perth Treaty between Australia and Indonesia as an opportunity for working together 'to counter non-traditional threats including terrorism and natural disasters'.<sup>20</sup> At the Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM) in June 2011, in what has been described as a 'robust discussion',<sup>21</sup> Foreign Minister Rudd – as he was at the time – counted 'energy and food security, disaster response and management, and counter-terrorism' as key non-traditional security challenges that were 'front and centre' for Australia.<sup>22</sup>

US administrations seem to be less comfortable with the actual term 'non-traditional security'. The US was, for example, one of only a few countries not to discuss non-traditional security in specific terms in its contribution to the 2011 ASEAN Regional Forum Regional Security Outlook in which NTS featured prominently in most chapters. Nevertheless, the US has not avoided NTS altogether. The US-Philippines Security Engagement Board, established under the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, was explicitly established to provide a framework and mechanism for liaison and consultation on 'non-traditional security concerns such as, but not limited to, terrorism, transnational crimes, maritime security and safety, natural and man-made disasters'.<sup>23</sup> According to Sheldon Simon, the US Pacific Command (PACOM) strategy confirmed in 2008 emphasizes 'the importance of cooperative security, particularly in the face of non-traditional security threats'.<sup>24</sup> The 2011 Joint Statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee recognised the need to address the emergence of non-traditional security concerns,<sup>25</sup> and the Joint Statement of the 2012 US-Republic of Korea Foreign and Defense Ministers'

Meeting referred to 'non-traditional security concerns, and other evolving threats'.<sup>26</sup>

## NTS in the Alliance

The 1951 ANZUS treaty which lies at the core of the Alliance is clearly embedded in a traditional security paradigm. The (then three) parties commit to 'develop[ing] their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack' as part of a collective defense arrangement (preamble; article II, article IV) and to respond to threats to 'territorial integrity, political independence or security' (article III). Yet there are (possibly unintended) hints of the foundations of a more flexible arrangement into which non-traditional security concerns might be inserted. In particular, the trilateral agreement – as it was then – anticipates in both the preamble and article VIII the 'development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area'. While there is nothing to suggest that 'comprehensive' was to be understood at that time in a more-than-military sense, the language and intent is sufficiently vague to enable and encourage institutional reflexivity and development over time. This foreshadows two lines of inquiry. The first, addressed in this section, focuses on the extent to which Australia and the United States have recognized non-traditional security as relevant to the direction and purpose of their bilateral security and alliance arrangements in the context of a post-Cold War recalibration of what security might or should mean. The second, in the following section, examines the ways in which the Alliance relationship has sought to be meaningful to the Asia Pacific region, including the extent of engagement with a burgeoning regional non-traditional security agenda.

NTS issues have made clear inroads into the bilateral dialogue and shared understanding of security although official statements demonstrate some reluctance to use the specific 'non-traditional security' term. Rather transnational,

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contemporary, new, emerging or global are the preferred descriptors. A quick review of AUSMIN communiqués from the last decade (or perhaps a little less) is instructive here. In the 2005 communiqué, the two countries acknowledged the growing importance of confronting contemporary security challenges.<sup>27</sup> In 2006, they reaffirmed their commitment to ‘work together on a wide range of global security issues’.<sup>28</sup> In 2010, the parties ‘considered a range of new and emerging security challenges of the 21st century’.<sup>29</sup> The 2011 communiqué referred to diplomats working together ‘to address emerging transnational challenges’ and promised that the alliance had in fact ‘succeeded in adapting and innovating to face the new challenges of the 21st Century’.<sup>30</sup> After the 2012 consultations, the most recent at time of writing, ministers released a communiqué more detailed than usual, listing priorities across a range of non-traditional security concerns including energy security, natural disasters, the environment and maritime security, war crimes, food security, and human right abuses.

A survey of AUSMIN communiqué and statements or speeches by political leaders in both US and Australian governments also helps to shed light on what falls into the Alliance’s NTS basket and why. From an Australian perspective, for example, we find the non-traditional security agenda defined variously to include:

- Climate change...cyber-threats, people-smuggling, pandemic, organized crime and piracy’ (described here as transnational security threats)<sup>31</sup>
- ‘Climate change, international terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, environmental degradation, energy security and health pandemics’<sup>32</sup>
- Pandemics and terrorism<sup>33</sup>
- The global economic crisis, climate change and energy security<sup>34</sup>
- ‘Terrorism ... [and] unregulated movements of people and goods’<sup>35</sup>

This is something of a mixed bag of non-traditional responses to the ‘security for whom and from what’ questions. Some – such as those associated with cyber-threats, terrorism and piracy – can be understood as an extension of a more

traditional concern with protecting territory, borders, infrastructure and sovereign materiel against identifiable ‘enemies’. People-smuggling also falls into this category of threats to borders. The differences, of course, are that the perpetrators of threat and insecurity are equally likely to be non-state actors, sometimes individuals and sometimes small, loosely networked groups, as they are to be state-sanctioned. Both the US and Australian governments remain, however, concerned about so-called cyber-attacks that emanate from or are conducted with the tacit support of other governments and with the challenges of ‘state-sponsored’ terrorism. These issues also overlap with security interests shared by both countries in maintaining free access to and use of the global commons – space, cyberspace, the oceans and international waters – which the US Department of Defense has described as ‘the vital connective tissue of the international system’.<sup>36</sup>

This menu of non-traditional security priorities is not, however, confined to direct challenges to national political and territorial integrity regardless of the source of the threat. Piracy and transnational crime, for example, are driven primarily by expectation of economic reward – both need and greed – on the part of those involved (with some possible overlap with terror groups who turn to criminality to generate funds). The security threat, as both countries see it, arises from destabilization of commercial markets, kleptocratic alliances with governments and security forces, and the way that criminal and illegal activity ‘undermines the stability of nations, subverting government institutions through corruption and harming citizens worldwide’.<sup>37</sup> Climate change is usually presented as a potential threat multiplier, overstressing societies’ adaptive capacities and creating or exacerbating political instability and violence, possibly to the extent of inter-state and even intra-state conflict. The triggers are assumed to include competition for resources, access to environmental services, and ‘potentially destabilising mass migration flows’<sup>38</sup> although those assumptions are subject to

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challenge on empirical and conceptual grounds.

Finally, NTS issues are sometimes explained in general terms as a threat to 'world peace and security'.<sup>39</sup> They have also been associated in some unspecific way with the 'rise of the Asia Pacific'.<sup>40</sup> Australian governments (or their spokespeople) have worried about the '[p]otential for competition for scarce resources such as oil, gas, water and food',<sup>41</sup> the '[p]otential to 'damage or undermine social and state cohesion',<sup>42</sup> and as 'very real threats to the sovereignty of many nations in our region'.<sup>43</sup> The less orthodox human security component of NTS often appears incidental to this analysis. Indeed, those who are affected or made insecure by NTS challenges such as pandemics or environmental degradation are just as likely to be characterized as the possible source of social tension, civil unrest, or border incursions.

## The Alliance and Practical Cooperation on NTS

In the words of the 2012 AUSMIN communiqué, the Alliance is intended to be 'above all about practical cooperation and collaboration'. The AUSMIN talks have produced formal, Alliance-based cooperation on two issues arising out of their explicit consideration of a 'range of new and emerging [that is, non-traditional] security challenges of the 21st century'. In 2010, the Australian defence minister Stephen Smith and the US secretary of defense Robert Gates signed a Space Situational Awareness Partnership Statement of Principles. This was intended to address a number of issues of concern: the increasing congestion of space, the importance of surveillance to detect likely collisions in space and the need to maintain space-based capacities for US and Australian defence forces including those capacities that support precision navigation and targeting, intelligence gathering, and secure global communications.<sup>44</sup> The commitment to intensifying cooperation on emerging security challenges in space was reiterated at the 2012 AUSMIN consultations with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on a US C-Band space surveillance radar to be operated jointly in Western Australia and agreement on working towards relocating a US space surveillance telescope to Australia.

During the 2011 AUSMIN talks, the US secretaries of state and defense, and the Australian ministers for defence and foreign affairs jointly released a statement on cyberspace which foreshadowed expectations of better collaboration on cyber issues. Ministers Smith and Rudd identified this as 'the key emerging transnational threat of the 21st century'.<sup>45</sup> Despite using language more associated with non-traditional security, the rationale remains decidedly traditional and territorial. Cyberspace is identified as a central to 'ensuring national security'. In a close echo of the language of the ANZUS treaty itself, the two countries agree to 'consult together ... [to] determine appropriate options' in the event of a cyber attack that 'threatens the territorial integrity, political independence or security' of either country.<sup>46</sup> Few concrete steps have been taken within the Alliance structure beyond the continuing commitment to continue to work closely together, and with the private sector, to address mutual cyberspace issues.

## The Alliance and the Asia-Pacific

The ANZUS treaty at the heart of the Alliance was explicitly focused on what was then called 'the Pacific Area'. Article VIII authorizes the parties, through their foreign ministers or deputies, to maintain a consultative relationship with 'States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area'. While consultations in a formal sense – what might be called ANUZS '+n' – have not eventuated, there is no doubt that the Asia Pacific provides a natural focus for the Alliance as it moves further into the 21st century.

Both the US and Australia see their Alliance as a 'strategic anchor for peace and stability' – particularly in the Asia Pacific – and one that should be able to 'adapt to address challenges as they arise'.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, the 2011 AUSMIN communiqué states that '[t]he U.S.-Australia alliance is key to peace and security in the region'.<sup>48</sup> Australia's Asian Century white paper understood the alliance as 'contributing to regional stability, security and peace'<sup>49</sup> a position reinforced in the 2013 National Security Strategy. In turn, both countries also see their own peace and security as a function of a secure Asia Pacific. If this is the case, then the two countries need



to be able to respond robustly to the security agenda identified by the region. That agenda (as Simon points out in the ASEAN context), is 'less fear of conventional military threats from neighboring countries than new challenges frequently referred to as "non-traditional threats," including infectious diseases, piracy, terrorism, drug and human trafficking, and international crime'.<sup>50</sup> Comprehensive (and cooperative) security and non-traditional security issues have come to feature prominently in regional security debates, most specifically under the auspices of the ASEAN Regional Forum but also through processes such as the Shangri-la Dialogue. As a report for the 10th anniversary of the latter noted, 'defence and security establishments in the region [have come to] place greater emphasis on responding to so-called 'non-traditional' concerns and 'common security' challenges including energy, food and water security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and pandemic disease'.<sup>51</sup>

The broad sweep of non-traditional security challenges recognizes issues that require attention in their own right. There is a further argument that NTS engagement can provide a platform for engaging other countries in the region – such as China and even DPRK – in a way that a more traditional security agenda cannot.<sup>52</sup> Indeed, some commentators suggest that this will enable not just diplomatic engagement but also provide a 'non-threatening context for otherwise wary neighbours to collaborate militarily'.<sup>53</sup> In this context, then, there are multiple incentives for the Alliance partners to make non-traditional security central to their bilateral relationship in the context of engaging with Cha's 'complex patchwork' of Asia's regional security architecture.

There is some evidence that the US and Australia have sought to adapt the Alliance partnership in this way. The 2006 US Quadrennial Defense Review argued that countering non-traditional threats was a key purpose of US security cooperation with regional partners, and outlined the importance of improving alliance capabilities to overcome such challenges.<sup>54</sup> The Australia-Japan-US Trilateral Security Dialogue has led the way, shifting 'toward a broader and largely NTS focus'.<sup>55</sup> As Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer noted in a press release following the first ministerial level TSD in 2006, the agenda 'encompassed pressing non-traditional

security issues, such as the response to major pandemics, which is another area in which each of our three countries is committed to building on the already significant contribution we have made to regional security'.<sup>56</sup> Recognition of non-traditional security challenges features regularly in post-TSD statements, sometimes in general terms and sometimes with a more detailed focus. The 2007 communique called for Australia, Japan and the US to address 'pressing non-traditional security issues' such as pandemics'.<sup>57</sup> In his official statement following the 2012 TSD, Defence Minister Smith referred to a range of issues that the US and Australia (along with Japan) have identified elsewhere as central to the non-traditional security agenda — including 'terrorism, piracy, large scale natural disasters, trafficking in arms, narcotics, and people, cyber threats, a congested and contested space domain ... and ensuring maritime security and freedom of navigation'.<sup>58</sup> The TSD partners have taken the non-traditional security agenda further into regional dialogues with issues such as terrorism and piracy (defined as 'transnational' security) featuring in their 'Quadrilateral' dialogue with India on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in May 2007.<sup>59</sup>

## Alliance Limits?

Both Alliance partners acknowledge that a changing security environment in Asia – one which includes non-conventional or non-traditional challenges – requires regional cooperation and regional engagement. At the same time, there is doubt about the extent to which a bilateral alliance that has its foundations in an orthodox military and defence milieu – and a hierarchical hub and spokes approach to regional security – can really adapt and adjust to the kinds of multilateral security arrangements and responses that non-traditional security challenges require. In effect, are the 'value sets' compatible or incommensurable? In a summary report for the UK-based Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs), Xenia Dormandy argues that US alliances in the Asia Pacific are 'not designed to deal with the growing non-traditional security challenges that will affect the region'.<sup>60</sup> Dormandy is not alone in this view. Bisley also suggests that 'in many ... examples of non-traditional security threats the alliance is of little use'.<sup>61</sup>

Commentators also offer some hope for the Alliance to address these issues, along with regional partners, in the context of a more complex ‘web-type’ structure of regional security arrangements.<sup>62</sup> Dormandy suggests that issues such as cyber threats and space security offer opportunities to shift from a ‘preoccupation with conventional military responses’ to ‘new and relatively uncharted areas of cooperative threat’.<sup>63</sup> Tow and Envall also suggest that the US is most likely to find multilateral arrangements attractive for dealing with non-traditional security challenges,<sup>64</sup> though this still leaves unanswered questions about the role of the Alliance in its bilateral form. But we can be sure that it will demand the ‘cooperative use of diplomacy and smart power’.<sup>65</sup>

## Recommendations: Mapping and Matching

As noted above (and in the words of the 2012 AUSMIN communiqué) the Alliance is intended to be ‘above all about practical cooperation and collaboration’. According to the Australian government’s National Security Strategy, the Alliance allows the two countries to ‘work together’ not just on issues of common concern but also to ‘make a practical contribution to regional and global security’.<sup>66</sup> However, cooperation in and of itself is not an outcome – it is a means to some other end. Clarity is required on what form practical cooperation might take beyond statements of principle. Clarity is also required on what the desired outcomes of ‘practical cooperation’ on NTS are intended to be, or what they should be, and how those outcomes will be evaluated or measured. The recommendations below identify actions to enhance the Alliance’s capacity to make practical contributions – in both the defence and broader security spheres – to bilateral and regional security, including human security, in the face of non-traditional security challenges. It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify in specific terms who should undertake or have responsibility for implementing these policy recommendations and delivering a broader (non-traditional) security mapping and capability analysis. However as the Alliance continues to adapt to regional security expectations and to account for an increasingly complex global (in)security agenda, it is important that the more traditional agencies of ‘security’ – in particular defence – continue to be recognised as stakeholders in the process of defining the policy complex but no longer owners

of it.

## Mapping NTS in the Alliance

Australia’s NTS suggests that practical cooperation on ‘modern security threats’, which includes non-traditional security threats, demands ‘joined up responses’.<sup>67</sup> Rather than joined up responses, we have what one defence commentator has called in the Australian context a ‘disjointed, haphazard and incremental’ approach to non-traditional security issues.<sup>68</sup> A coherent policy mapping exercise should therefore be undertaken jointly by US and Australia with a view to overcoming this incrementalism and to set a baseline for the Alliance’s NTS agenda. The 2012 AUSMIN communiqué should provide a framework for such a mapping exercise, focusing on a set of NTS issues on which the Alliance partners have committed to working together but on which the strategies for practical cooperation remain unclear or ad hoc:

- Food security
- Trafficking in persons
- Pandemic threats
- Energy security
- Environmental security

This mapping exercise will require more than a listing of ‘security challenges’. It will require the following:

- awareness of the importance of conceptual clarity and coherence on the nature of threat in each case and in general terms (are all NTS issues understood in the same ‘threat’ terms for example; where does human security fit within the Alliance’s approach to NTS). This should be achieved through desk study of key documents supplemented by interviews with key personnel.
- attention to the breadth of the policy landscape – a form of forward looking

‘policy tracing’ – through identifying key agencies and other stakeholders in both countries who are or should be involved in NTS-related policy development and service delivery in an Alliance context.

- evaluating relevance (low to high) to Alliance priorities and establishing key indicators for Alliance ‘security relevance’.

## Risk Analysis

Australia’s National Security Strategy calls for an increasing use of risk-based systems.<sup>69</sup> Risk-analysis involves methods for evaluating the probability of particular threats/challenges but can also involve qualitative descriptions of the components of those challenges as well as the knowledge base upon which decisions about risk are made. At an operational level, risk-based systems are expected to be intelligence rather than just knowledge led. The Alliance parties should focus on understanding how risk-based analysis functions in the field of NTS in general as well as how this translates to Alliance strategies for practical cooperation. The Alliance partners should agree first to undertake an Alliance-based risk analysis (rather than an individual country risk analysis) on the two NTS issues on which a degree of cooperation has been established – cyber-security and space situational awareness.

## Capability Needs Analysis

Developing strategies for practical cooperation on NTS requires a structured approach to identifying capability needs. As Yates points out, this requires understanding the nature of national security threats (see the mapping exercise above) as well as undertaking a capability gap analysis.<sup>70</sup> Such an analysis will need to evaluate:

- defence interoperability and capabilities for meeting NTS challenges
- an assessment of civilian capability needs and gaps
- discussions about appropriate burden-sharing expectations.

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## Evaluating Article VII Action

As noted earlier in this paper, article VIII of the ANZUS treaty authorizes the parties, meeting as the ANZUS Council (foreign ministers and/or their deputies), to maintain a consultative relationship with ‘States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area’. Much of that relationship exists in other forms, through the participation of Australia and the US in the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Trilateral Security Dialogue, as ASEAN dialogue partners, as participants in the Shangri-la Dialogue and the ADMM Plus. The parties should explore specific options for article VIII consultative relationships on NTS issues including evaluating whether such options would ‘value add’ in terms of practical cooperation.

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